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I. THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
A broad scientific consensus exists that climate change is real and the
amount and rate of change have accelerated; the only uncertainty is about
the political will of the international community to take effective measures
to combat it. In November 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) unequivocally concluded that atmospheric concentrations of
four long-lived greenhouse gases (GHGs)-carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), and halocarbons (a group of gases containing
fluorine, chlorine, or bromine)--have significantly increased globally as a
result of human activities since the Industrial Revolution.' The IPCC,
established through a collaboration of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO),
comprises an international group of scientists, who stated with more than
sixty-six percent assessed probability of occurrence that agricultural
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1. IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 37, available at www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (last visited Mar., 10, 2010). This was the 1PCC's Fourth
Assessment Report.
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activities, fossil fuel use, and land-use change are primarily responsible for
this change. Also, advancements since 2001, when the IPCC issued its last
assessment report, show that the human impact extends beyond average
temperature to temperature extremes and wind patterns.2
For example, in October 2008, a report to the government of Australia
predicted that CO2 emissions will continue to rise by more than three
percent per year until 2030. 3 This contrasts with the IPCC's worst-case
scenario--that global CO2 levels would rise by more than two percent per
year; a growth rate of two percent is the IPCC's median scenario, on which
most government projections are based. New research published since the
release of IPCC's 2007 report paints a bleaker picture of the planet's
environment.
Subsequently, the 2009 UNEP Yearbook warned: "The changing
climate is pushing many Earth systems towards critical thresholds that will
alter regional and global environmental balances and threaten stability at
multiple scales. Alarmingly, we may have already passed tipping points
that are irreversible within the time span of our current civilization.
'A
This report notes that ice melt in the Arctic, the Antarctic, and
Greenland is much worse than the IPCC had projected, and that it is
formally to be attributed to human influence. It states that researchers used
place-specific gridded data sets and simulations from four different climate
models, concluding that "human activities have already caused significant
warming in both polar regions with likely consequences for indigenous
communities, biological systems, ice-sheet mass balance, and global sea
levels. 5 Citing a 2008 Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing Center
study, the report states:
For the second year in a row, there was an ice-free channel in the
Northwest Passage through the islands of northern Canada. But
this year also saw the opening of the Northern Sea Route along
the Arctic Siberian coast. The two passages have probably not
been open simultaneously since before the last ice age, some
2. Id. at 40.
3. Ross Gamaut, Australian Stern Review (Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.
gamautreview.org.au/index.htm#pdf (last visited Mar., 10, 2010).
4. UNEP Yearbook 2009, New Science and Developments in Our Changing Environment 21
(2009) [hereinafter UNEP Yearbook 2009], available at http://www.unep.org/geo/yearbook/
yb2009/PDF/UNEPYearBook_2008_ENFull.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
5. Id. at 22.
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100,000 years ago .... Theoretically, in 2008 the Arctic ice cap
could have been circumnavigated.
6
As to the Greenland and Antarctica ice sheet loss, the report cites a
2008 study stating that "[n]ew findings in 2008 revealed that the flow into
the ocean of the Jakobshavn and Isbrae glacier in western Greenland, one of
the most important routes for ice loss, has doubled since 1997." 7  The
European Space Agency reported in April 2009 on the risk of the ice bridge
supporting the Wilkins Ice Shelf, which connects it to the Charcot and
Latady Islands, partly breaking away from the Antarctic Peninsula.8
Another NASA study reported in January 2009 that West Antarctica is now
also warming, according to a climate researcher at the University of
Washington in Seattle who led the study.9
A disturbing scenario is the potential for the physical breakup of the
ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica, which could result in the rise of
global sea levels to far exceed the last IPCC assessment forecast of up to
sixty centimeters by 2100. What if the sea level were to rise by one meter
by the end of the century? It would certainly create havoc globally for
coastal states, as the Maldives, along with Kiribati and Tuvalu in the Pacific
and the island of Sunderbans in the Bay of Bengal, would be submerged.
And, as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has observed:
Sinking island states present one of the most dramatic scenarios
of the impact of climate change. The entire populations of low-
lying States such as the Maldives, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the
Marshall Islands may in future be obliged to leave their own
country as a result of climate change. Moreover, the existence of
6. Id. An April 2009 study by NASA scientists confirmed this finding by reporting that "ice
cover on the North Pole is shrinking and getting thinner, too. That's both a sign and a cause of
continued rising temperatures .... .See Keith Johnson, Ice, Ice Maybe: NASA Reports Greater Arctic
Ice Melt, Wall St. Journal (wsj.com), Apr. 6, 2009. A similar result was also revealed in a 2008 study
by the European Space Agency. European Space Agency, Arctic ice on the verge of another all-time
low, 28 August 2008, available at http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMCKXOSAKF-index_2.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010).
7. UNEP Yearbook 2009, supra note 4, at 23.
8. European Space Agency, Collapse of the ice bridge supporting Wilkins Ice Shelf appears
imminent, 3 April 2009, available at http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMDO7EHITF-index_2.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
9. NASA, Satellites Confirm Half-Century of West Antarctic Warming, Jan. 1, 2009,
available at www nasa.gov.tpics/earth/features/warming-antarctica.html. (last visited Mar. 12 2010).
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their State as such may be threatened. Entire populations of
affected states could thus become stateless.'
0
Based upon research since the IPCC Assessment Forecast, UNEP
states that a much larger rise is possible and indeed probable. It cites several
studies predicting a rise between 0.8 and 1.5 meters as the likely outcome
by the end of this century, which would displace around 100 million people
in Asia. The report concludes that:
[R]esearch in 2008 indicates that sea level rise-from thermal
expansion, mountain glacier retreat, and ice sheet melt-is likely
to be much greater and to arrive much sooner than believed even
two years ago. No matter how quickly climate change is
mitigated, sea level will rise. So, efforts to adapt to rising seas
are more urgent than ever. l
Thus, the IPCC chairman, Dr. Rajendra K. Pachauri, has aptly called
upon politicians to respond to new research showing that the sea level rise
is likely to be far worse than the prior U.N. projections. "They should
certainly respond to a worst-case scenario-even if there is only a small risk
that it becomes reality-because it will have terrible consequences. It is
quite common risk management."'
12
Is all this potential adverse impact of climate change leading to
disastrous consequences? The UNEP report is not sanguine. The following
two statements are pertinent: 1) "[w]ith possibilities of collapsing ice
sheets, methane bubbling out of permafrost, desiccated rainforest
ecosystems, and sporadic ocean circulation patterns, concern is growing
that Earth's life-support systems are approaching thresholds that contain
tipping points;' ' 13 and 2) citing two studies from the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, the UNEP report concludes:
[T]he evidence suggests that we may be within a few years of
crossing tipping points with potential to disrupt seasonal weather
patterns that support the agriculture activities of half the human
10. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Submission: Climate Change and Statelessness:
An Overview, June 2009, available at http://unfccc.ing/resource/docs/2009/msn/igo/048.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010).
11. UNEP Y.B. 2009, supra note 4, at 25.
12. Rajendra K. Pachauri, IPCC-Chairman to politicians: Respond to worst-case scenarios-
head of the UN. 's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change urges politicians to respond to new
scientific climate research, Mar. 3, 2009, available at http:/en.cop15.dklnews/view+news?newsid=868
(last visited Mar. 12 2010).
13. UNEP Y.B. 2009, supra note 4, at 28.
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population, diminished carbon sinks in the oceans and on land,
and destabilize major ice sheets that could introduce
unanticipated rates of sea level rise within the 21 st century.14
If humanity faces dire consequences unless it resolutely acts to take
effective mitigation actions and to undertake appropriate adaptation
measures, why has there been such reluctance and resistance to do so?
Obviously, there is not the political will to act firmly, notwithstanding the
urgency. There is a sharp divide between the developed and developing
countries on how to operationalize the "common but
differentiated responsibilities" principle. Developing countries demand that
major industrialized nations, which have primarily caused the problem,
commit to steep cuts in carbon emissions in the short term and provide the
necessary resources and technology so that countries without the
wherewithal to undertake mitigation and adaptation measures are able to
participate in the solution to this crisis. Many developed countries, on the
other hand, seek firm commitments and timetables from the developing
countries, without which, they argue, no international agreement can be
reached.
II. IMPACT ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
All indications are that the brunt of the adverse impacts of global
climate change will be felt hardest by some of the poorest and most
vulnerable communities, which have already begun to suffer from its
effects. Kemal Dervis, Administrator of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) and Achim Steiner, UNEP Executive Director, make the
point in UNDP's Human Development Report 2007-2008: "The effect that
increased droughts, extreme weather events, tropical storms and sea level
rises will have on large parts of Africa, on many small island states and
coastal zones will be inflicted in our lifetimes . . . . [F]or some of the
world's poorest people, the consequences could be apocalyptic.""
They add, "[i]n the long run climate change is a massive threat to
human development and in some places it is already undermining the
international community's efforts to reduce extreme poverty.
16
The UNDP Report's message is clear:
14. Id. at29.
15. UNDP, Human Development Report 2007-2008-Fighting Climate Change: Human
Solidarity in a Divided World, at v (2008).
16. Id.
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The early warning signs are already visible. Today, we are
witnessing at first hand what could be the onset of major human
development reversal in our lifetime. Across developing
countries, millions of the world's poorest people are already
being forced to cope with the impacts of climate change ....
[I]ncreased exposure to drought, to more intense storms, to floods
and environmental stress is holding back the efforts of the
world's P7oor to build a better life for themselves and their
children.
The Report warns that climate change could lead to "ecological
catastrophes" as we are edging toward "tipping points." 18 The outcome
could be that the Millennium Development Goals' 9 will not be met, which,
in effect, means that the world's poor would not be able to satisfy their
basic human needs and hence would suffer from widespread violation of
their fundamental human rights enshrined in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.2°
The nature of future impacts on developing countries is brought to the
world's attention by Working Group II of the IPCC's Fourth Assessment
Report. According to the report, between 75 million and 250 million
people in Africa are projected to suffer increased water stress caused by
climate change by 2020.21 It is also projected that agricultural production,
including access to food, will be severely compromised in many African
countries, which will adversely affect food security and exacerbate
malnutrition, and that the sea level will rise, affecting low-lying coastal
areas with large populations.22 The report further projects that in Asia
glaciers will melt and recede in the Himalayas, which will increase flooding
and affect water resources within the next two to three decades.
Consequently, more than a billion people could be adversely affected by the
2050s because of the projected decrease of freshwater availability due to
23
climate change, which also will cause an increase in deadly diseases.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 2.
19. U.N., The Millennium Development Goals Report (2009).
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, concluded at New York,
Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force January 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 36 (1967).
21. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policy Makers, at 13, Apr. 2007, available at





As to the impact of global warming on Latin America, the report
projects that there will be a risk of significant biodiversity loss in many
areas, increased risk of flooding in low-lying areas because of sea level rise,
and significant adverse effect on water availability due to changes in
precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers.24 The report notes
that small islands located in the tropics or higher latitudes are especially
vulnerable to the effects of climate change, extreme events, and sea level
rise.25 This could affect local resources such as fisheries, exacerbate
inundation, storm surge, and erosion; by mid-century reduction of water
resources on many small islands, such as those in the Caribbean and
Pacific, will be such that they become insufficient to meet the population's
demand during the periods of low rainfall.26
III. ADDRESSING GLOBAL WARMING AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES'
CONCERNS AND NEEDS: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
A. Addressing Global Warming
How does international law respond to the problem of global
warming? A starting point is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,
which forms the basis for international law to address climate change and
captures the tension between sovereignty and environmental protection:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. 27
Also pertinent is the concept of state responsibility developed by the
United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) in its Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, under which responsibility does require fault,28 that
is, a wrongful act or negligence.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Working Group 11, supra note 21, at 15.
27. Stockholm Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16,
1972, Princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 3 (1973), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, at 2-65 and
Corr. 1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
28. U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No 10, at 125, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
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Subsequently, the ILC addressed environmental harm that is
unintentional or occurs despite due diligence by establishing a parallel basis
for remedies when there is no fault. The ILC called it "state liability" and
gave it the title "Draft Articles on International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law. 29
Thus, we have two alternative jurisprudential bases for rectifying harms to
the environment: 1) fault-based responsibility, and 2) no-fault (strict or
absolute) "liability." The latter means that a state act could give rise to
liability even if it did not violate international environmental law.
For at least the following five reasons, the "no harm" rule embodied in
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, is, however, inadequate to
address the climate change problem. First, it is not easy to trace climate
change sources and to measure them since they are widespread.
Consequently, it will be a formidable task to allocate responsibility among
states because it is often their combined activities that cause climate change.
Second, while Principle 21 aims at balancing a state's responsibility to
avoid harming other nations with its right to exploit its environment, many
developing nations consider the latter right as their right to economic
development, and thus as their priority concern taking precedence over their
abstract responsibility to the international community. Third, allocation of
responsibility is well-nigh impossible because of the time lag between GHG
emissions and their adverse effects. Fourth, few developing countries have
the wherewithal to find alternatives to fossil fuels on which they are highly
dependent. Thus applying the principles of common but differentiated
responsibilities and intragenerational equity assumes a central role as we
explore the means to respond to climate change. Finally, monetary
damages are obviously not an adequate remedy once the damage is done.
The Special Rapporteur of the ILC's Draft Articles on Liability put it
well when he stated that the liability approach is premised on state
obligations, which presuppose "an identifiable State of origin, affected State
and identifiable harm. The framework of the topic did not seem to be
appropriate for dealing with harm to the human environment as a whole,
when there were many States of origin and virtually the whole community
of mankind was affected. 3
0
That is why neither the Principle 21 approach nor the ILC's liability
approach is workable. Instead, the focus has to be on international
cooperation and prevention. This cooperation is reflected in the U.N.'s
efforts to establish a multilateral treaty to address the challenge of climate
change. After years of studies, followed by negotiations on an international
29. U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/10 (1989).
30. U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/43/10 (1988).
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accord, in 1992 the U.N. adopted the Framework Convention on Climate
Change31 (Climate Convention), which recognized climate change as a
serious threat and set an "ultimate objective [of achieving] stabilization of
[GHGs] . . . at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. 3 2 The Convention established a goal
of reducing GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000,33 but provided
no concrete targets or timeframe for achieving that goal. Instead, it deferred
development of any binding state targets and timetables for a later protocol.
Five years later, in 1997, at the Third Conference of the Parties to the
Climate Convention (COP), held in Kyoto, Japan, the parties signed the
Kyoto Protocol,34 which was created as a framework for future action. The
Protocol advanced the implementation process envisaged in the Climate
Convention as it included commitments by specified developed countries to
reduce GHGs, averaging 5.2 percent below the benchmark 1990
concentration levels by the 2008-2012 period.35  It also included
commitments by the developing countries and introduced market-based
"flexibility mechanisms" for implementation, which will be detailed later.
Selected developments since the Kyoto COP will be highlighted here.
In 1998 in Buenos Aires, the Parties adopted a "Plan of Action," setting out
a program of work on the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol.36 In
2001, the parties adopted the "Bonn Agreements," aimed at completing key
issues under the Buenos Aires Plan of Action,37 and subsequently at
Marrakesh38 the signatories to the Climate Convention agreed on rules for
implementing the Kyoto Protocol, which came into force on February 15,
31. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 1.L.M. 849
(1992), available at www.unfccc.de/resource/convkp.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter
Climate Convention].
32. Id. art 2.
33. Id. art 4(2)(a), (b).
34. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, Jap., Dec, 11, 1997, Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, arts. 6, 17, U.N. FCCC/CP/1997/7/
Add.2, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998), available at www.unfccc.de/resource/confkp.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
35. Id. art. 3(1), Annex B.
36. See United Nations Framework Convenion on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties,
Buenos Aires, Argentina, Nov. 2-14, 1998, Report of the Conference of the Parties, on its Fourth
Session, U.N. Doc. FCCCICP/1998/16/Add.1 (1999), available at www.unfccc.int/resource/process/
components/response/landmarks.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
37. See id.
38. See Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, held at Marrakesh from
21 October to 10 November, 2001, U.N. Doc. FCCC/2001/13 (2002), available at www.unfccc.int/
resource.docs/cop7/13.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
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2005.39 At Marrakesh, a decision was also undertaken to establish an
Adaptation Fund "to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes
in developing country Parties that are Parties to the Protocol, as well as
[other specifically identified] activities."40 It was also agreed that the
Adaptation Fund "shall be financed from the share of proceeds on the clean
development mechanism project activities and other sources of funding."41
The Fund is governed by a board under the direction of the State Parties to
the Protocol.
Further, meetings of the COP and the Conference of the Parties,
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COMP), were
held in 2005 in Montreal,42 2006 in Nairobi,43 and in 2007 in Bali,44 where
the Bali Roadmap for future negotiations and the Bali Action Plan were
adopted.45
The Parties took several initiatives at Bali.46 They recognized that
"deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate
objective of the Convention and emphasiz[ed] the urgency to address
climate change as indicated in the [IPCC's] Fourth Assessment Report.A
7
Key elements of the plan included the launching of a new negotiation
process to be completed by the end of 2009 for adoption at the Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen. It is a two-track negotiating process,
as the Parties established an Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Cooperative Action as a subsidiary body under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Control (UNFCCC) to conduct the
process of negotiating an agreement by 2009 on measures to be undertaken
by developed as well as developing country Parties to the Convention. The
goal is to establish the Parties' legally binding commitments beyond 2012,
39. See unfccc.int/meetings/unfccc_calendar/items/2655.php?id=397&out-detail (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010).
40. Marrakesh Accords, supra note 38, Add. 1, Decision 10/CP.7, 1.
41. Id.
42. See U.N. Climate Change Conference, Nov. 25 to Dec. 9, 2005, Montreal Can., COP 11 &
CMP 1, unfccc.int/meetings/copi l/items/3394.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
43. See U.N. Climate Change Conference, Nov, 6-17, 2006, Nairobi, Kenya, Nairobi 2006,
unfccc.int/meetings/cop_ 12/items/3754.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
44. See The U.N. Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indon., Dec. 3-14, 2007,
unfccc.int/meetings/copl3/items/4049.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
45. Id. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Indon., Dec, 3-15, Conference of
the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, I/CP.13, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add. 1, at 3 (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan].
46. See generally Bali Action Plan, supra note 45, at 3-7.
47. Id. at 3.
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when the first commitments to mitigate climate change under the Kyoto
Protocol end.
[The Parties agreed on] a shared vision for long-term cooperative
action, including a long-term goal for emissions reductions, to
achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, in accordance
with..., in particular the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, and taking into
account social and economic conditions and other relevant
factors.
48
On the actions to be considered for mitigation of climate change, the
plan contains two separate paragraphs-one for developed country
considerations and one for developing countries. For developed countries,
the paragraph includes "[m]easurable, reportable and verifiable nationally
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions," and for developing
countries, "[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions.., in the context of
sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing
and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner."49
Along with defining the scope and content of the review of the Kyoto
Protocol, the Parties decided to take enhanced action on technology
development and transfer, and financing of climate change action. The
Parties also decided that the Adaptation Fund is to finance concrete
adaptation projects and programs that are country-driven. The Parties at
Bali took a major decision to include the reduction of emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation as one of the considerations during the
negotiations to follow Bali.50 The Parties noted that "sustainable reduction
in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing
countries requires stable and predictable availability of resources.',' The
Program of Work is to be undertaken as related to "a range of policy
approaches and positive incentives that aim to reduce emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries.... 52
Next, the Parties met in Poznafi, Poland, from the first to the twelfth of
December 2008. 5 ' The Ad Hoc Working Group, which had met at four
sessions during 2008, reported that it had
48. Id. 1(a).
49. Id l(b)(i)-(ii).
50. Id. at 8.
51. Bali Action Plan, supra note 45, at 8.
52. Id at 9, para. 7.
53. The Parties agreed on a plan of action and programs of work for the year 2008-09 relating
to future commitments and actions. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ponzan, Pol., Dec. 1-
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considered all of the elements of the Bali Action Plan at each
session, taking into account the interlinkages among them . . .
[b]y addressing a shared vision for long-term cooperative action,
enhanced action on adaptation and its associated means of
implementation, enhanced action on mitigation and its associated
means of implementation, and delivering on technology and
financing, including consideration of institutional arrangements.
54
At the meeting, the Working Group also reported the ideas and
proposals presented by the Parties to it on these elements of the Bali Action
Plan.55 The Group's work program for 2009 includes producing a
negotiating text in June.56 Among other decisions, the Parties adopted rules
of procedure of the Adaptation Fund Board and also its priorities, policies,
and guidelines.57 They also provided further guidance related to the Clean
Development Mechanism.
58
12, 2008, Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourteenth Session,
78, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2008/7 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/
cop_14/items/4481 .php (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). The second review of the Kyoto Protocol under its
Article 9, which requires a periodic review of the treaty in the light of the best available scientific
information on climate change and its impacts, as well as pertinent technical, social, and economic
information, took place there. The capacity of Parties to participate in the CDM was also reviewed.
54. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1-12, 2008, Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Report to the Conference of
the Parties at its Fourteenth Session on Progress Made, at 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLTA/2008/L. 11
(Dec. 10, 2008).
55. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1-10, 2008, Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Ideas and Proposals on
Paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/16/Rev. I (Jan. 15, 2009).
56. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1-10, 2008, Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Work Programme for 2009,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/L. 10 (Dec. 10, 2008).
57. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, Jap., Report of the Adaptation Fund
Board, Decision -/CMP.4 (advance unedited version), available at unfccc.int/files/meetings/
cop_14/application/pdf/cmpaf.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). For the Board's report to the Parties,
see Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, Conference of the
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Report of the Adaptation Fund
Board, at 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/2 (Sept. 30, 2009).
58. Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanism, Decision -/CMP.4,
available at unfccc.intlfiles/meetings/cop_14/application/pdf/cmpcdm.pdf. For the Annual report of
the Executive Board of the clean development mechanism, see Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1-12, 2008, Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol, Annual report of the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism to
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doe.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2008/4 (Nov. 14, 2008).
As mentioned earlier, the negotiation process launched in Bali is to be
reviewed in Copenhagen in December 2009.
B. Addressing the Developing Countries' Concerns and Needs Under the
Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
1. General
First, developing countries are required to assume mitigation
obligations, although the commitment is voluntary as no specific targets and
timetables were set. Under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol,
all parties are to establish and report national programs which contain
measures to mitigate climate change. Another provision of the Protocol
reaffirms this obligation and further seeks to advance the implementation of
the developing countries' commitments.59 Second, the Protocol implicitly
recognizes that developing countries are vulnerable to the adverse impacts
of climate change as it requires developed countries to provide financial
resources and transfer of technology to meet the developing countries costs'
of implementing their obligations of emissions reduction.60
The Convention established the Global Environment Facility as the
financial mechanism to fund developing countries' needs, which is also the
entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention operating the Least
Developed Countries Fund.6 1  These Kyoto Protocol provisions reflect
application of the principle of common-but-differentiated responsibilities.
It should be emphasized that the developing countries' commitments under
the Protocol are voluntary and contingent upon the developed countries'
assistance. Also, the Adaptation Fund has been established to assist
developing countries in their adaptation activities.
59. Climate Convention, supra note 31, art. 10.
60. Id. art. 4(3). Under Article 4(7), implementation of developing countries' commitments
depends upon the developed countries' funding and technology transfer.
61. Global Development Facility, http://www.thegef.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). The
GEF is designed to fund developing countries' programs and projects that protect the global
environment. Its programmatic focus is on: biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land
degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants. The Parties provided further guidance
for the operation of the Least Developed Countries Fund at the Poznan Conference. See Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 1-12, 2008, Conference of the Parties, Report of the
Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties, at 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2008/2 (Dec.
19, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resourcefdocs/2008/copl4/eng/02rOl.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2010).
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2. The Clean Development Mechanism
One of the market-based flexibility approaches devised under the
Kyoto Protocol is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).62 The basic
elements of the CDM are set out in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and are
further supplemented by the 2001 Marrakesh Accords,63 which articulated
how this mechanism works. The CDM Executive Board oversees the
process under the direction of the State Parties to the Protocol.
The CDM is aimed at reducing carbon emissions. It operates by
allowing Annex 1 countries (comprising industrialized countries that were
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
in 1992, as well as countries transitioning from socialist economies,
including Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and several Central and
Eastern European states) to earn credits either by governments or private
parties in these countries as they engage in project-based activities in
developing countries to assist them in reducing their emissions. The credits
they earn in developing countries are called "Certified Emissions
Reductions" (CERs). CERs are measured in metric tons of CO2 equivalent
and can be sold to buyers in industrialized countries. The CDM Executive
Board issues CERs, registers and validates projects, and manages several
panels and working groups. Thus, the twin purposes of the CDM are: 1) to
assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development, and 2) to
allow Annex I countries flexibility in complying with their emissions
reduction targets.
Electric power plants, wind-based power facilities, and afforestation
and reforestation projects that reduce non-CO2 industrial greenhouse gases
illustrate CDM project activities. It should be specially noted that CDM
emissions reductions are required to be supplemental to those that would
have otherwise occurred without the project, and that a share of the
proceeds from certified project activities is to be used to assist developing
country parties to meet the cost of adaptation. It is also noteworthy that the
only requirement on the part of the host government is that it must
affirmatively endorse any CDM project occurring there.
62. Besides the Bubble Agreement contained in its Article 4, the Kyoto Protocol established
three mechanisms for extra-territorial emissions reductions-emissions trading (under Article 17 of the
Protocol), joint implementation (under Article 6), and the CDM. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 34, arts. 6,
17.
63. Marrakesh Accords, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, Jan. 21, 2002, at 20-49.
[Vol. 16:2
Nanda
Several potential benefits of the CDM include the reduction of GHGs,
technology transfer to developing countries, 64 and help for developing
countries in their adaptation activities since a percentage of transactions
would be targeted for that purpose. 65  The cumulative effect is hoped to
result in alleviation of poverty.
Although the CDM program was launched in November 2001, the first
project was registered three years later, and the first CERs were issued in
October 2005.66 As of 16 October 2009, there were 1,860 registered CDM
projects in fifty-eight countries, and approximately 2,900 further project
activities are in the registration pipeline.67 It is expected that the CDM will
generate more than 2.7 billion tradable CERs when the first commitment of
the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012.68 UNEP's Executive Director, Achim
Steiner, stated in October 2007 that "100 billion dollars of funds are
[estimated] to flow from the North to the South as a result of the Clean
Development Mechanism.,
69
India (thirty-two percent of registered projects), China (nineteen
percent), and Brazil (thirteen percent) have dominated the CDM activity.70
A continuing shift in investment from developed to developing countries is
in evidence, as the share of new investment has grown from thirteen percent
(1.8 billion dollars) to twenty-three percent (26 billion dollars) in 2007,
with China, India, and Brazil together accounting for eighty-two percent of
64. For a report on analysis of technology transfer in CDM projects, see Stephen Seres, et al.,
Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects, Dec. 2008, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/
Reference/ReportsTIreportlreportI 207.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
65. Climate Convention, supra note 31, art. 4.
66. An Overview of our Changing Environment, 2008 U.N. Envt. Prog. Y.B. 25, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GCSS/X/INF/2.
67. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009,
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Annual Report of
the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism to the Conference of the Parties serving as
the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, at 5, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16 (Nov. 4,
2009).
68. Id. at 1. U.N. Under-Secretary General and Executive Director of U.N.E.P., Achim
Steiner, stated in October 2007 that "[a]n estimated 100 billion dollars of funds are set to flow from the
North to the South as a result of the Clean Development Mechanism." Achim Steiner, The United
Nations Response to the Environmental Challenges of the 21st Century, at 4, (Oct. 8, 2007),
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.Print.asp?Documentid=520&articleID=5608&1=
en (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
69. Steiner, supra note 68, at 4.
70. U.N. Envt. Prog., Global Trends in Sustainable Energy Investment 2008: Analysis of
Trends and Issues in the Financing of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, at 3, available at
http://sefi.unep.org/fileadmin/media/sefi/docs/publications/Execsummary.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2010).
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this investment.7 However, in terms of emission credits generated, China
leads with fifty-three percent, followed by India with just fifteen percent.
By the end of 2007, 12.95 billion dollars had been raised by carbon funds.72
A major challenge is to ensure that countries in Africa benefit from the
CDM. To meet this challenge, then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan
launched what is called the Nairobi Framework in 2006. Several U.N. and
affiliated organizations-UNEP, the U.N. Development Program, the
World Bank, African Development Bank, and the FCCC Secretariat--came
together to implement the Nairobi Framework, with the U.N. Secretariat
acting as catalyst and facilitator.73 Its initial focus has been to assist six
sub-Sahara African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Tanzania, and Zambia) in building their capacity to take advantage of the
CDM process, with the governments of Spain, Sweden, and Finland,
contributing 1.5 million dollars to the project.74
Although it has to be a matter of considerable concern that only 27 of
the 1,150 registered CDM projects were in Africa as of September 2008,
cumulative CDM projects in the pipeline for African countries as of that
date were seventy-one, including fifty-one for sub-Saharan Africa. Also,
the FCCC Secretariat reports that "CDM is growing on the continent and is
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See John Kilani, The Nairobi Framework: Catalyzing the CDM in Africa,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/NairobiFramework/index.html. (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). The Framework has
five objectives as key priority targets:
a) Build and enhance capacity of [Designated National Authorities] to become
fully operational;
b) Build capacity in developing CDM project activities;
c) Promote investment opportunities for projects;




74. During the first year of the Framework, Konrad von Ritter, Sector Manager for Sustainable
Development at the World Bank Institute, noted:
There has been notable increase in capacity-development resulting in a pipeline of
30 CDM projects. Of these, 14 have already signed emissions reduction
purchasing agreements with World Bank carbon funds. While this is positive we
all know that more needs to be done, and therefore the critical importance of the
Nairobi Framework to scale up capacity development.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Press Release, Secretariat, Important Steps Taken to
Expand CDM in Africa, Much Remains to be Done: Nairobi Framework Partners, at 2, (Dec. 6, 2007),
available at
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news-room/pressreleases-and advisories/application/pdf/nf release englis
h.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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already estimated to be stimulating several billion dollars' worth of capital
investment in the seven African countries hosting projects. Market
stakeholders and policy-makers are looking for ways to multiply these
benefits. 75  In October 2008, Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the
UNFCCC and the U.N.'s highest-ranking climate change official, exhorted
African countries to participate in the current climate change negotiations
which present them "with a golden opportunity to change things for the
better and design a Copenhagen deal that works for Africa. For this to
happen, it is crucial that African Countries put their concerns on the table
and push for solutions that respond to their specific problems. 76
3. Other Assistance to Developing Countries
In December 2006 UNEP and the UNDP launched a joint climate
change initiative. 7 This partnership aims at further assisting countries to
achieve sustainable development while they confront the changing climate.
It extends to all least-developed countries and other developing countries,
with a special emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa. Its two core objectives are:
"1) Incorporate adaptation into national development plans and U.N.
Cooperation Frameworks[;] and 2) Enable countries to access carbon
finance and cleaner technologies to stimulate sustainable development.,
78
75. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Press Release, Secretariat, Africa Hardest Hit
by Climate Change, Deserves Greater Share of Carbon Market Benefits: UN. 's Top Climate Change
Official, at I (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_
releases and advisories/application/pdf/20080903/afiica//carbon/forum/press/release.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010).
76. Id. at 2.
77. U.N. Envt. Prog., Governing Council, Twenty-Fourth Session of the Governing
Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Cooperation Between the United Nations Environment
Programme and the United Nations Development Programme, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/24/NF/19,
(Dec. 13, 2006).
78. Id. at 5. See id., Appendix 2: UNDP-UNEP Partnership on Climate Change, at 11-12.
The report makes a telling point:
To date, the benefits of the Clean Development Mechanism have largely by-
passed the Least Developed Countries. Only a handful of countries account for
the bulk of registered CDM projects, and there are concerns that the types of
CDM projects registered so far provide limited development benefits. To realize
the full potential of the CDM as the financing mechanism for sustainable
development, a key challenge for developing countries is to remove the
institutional, legal and capacity barriers that limit their access to the flourishing
and dynamic carbon finance market. To help developing countries address this
challenge, UNDP and UNEP will increase their current collaboration in carbon
finance, directly supporting the Nairobi Framework on Catalyzing the CDM in
Africa agreed at COP12 by six agencies.
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V. CONCLUSION
Climate change poses a formidable challenge for all countries, but its
major impact will be on developing countries, especially the least
developed countries, as they lack the resources, capacity, logistics, and
wherewithal they need to fulfill their mitigation obligations and to
undertake adaptation activities. Thus, the assistance of developed countries
becomes imperative. International environmental law, as well as
international human rights law, can play a robust role as appropriate
mechanisms are crafted to support developing countries in their response to
the adverse impacts of climate change. The matter is urgent and calls for
political will to make it happen. However, the initial expectations that the
Climate Change Conference in December 2009 in Copenhagen might result
in the adoption of a successor to the Kyoto Protocol are not likely to be met.
Instead a political accord may be reached there which might ultimately lead
to a comprehensive and operational agreement with specific targets and
timetables.79
79. See Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President to Attend
Copenhagen Climate Talks (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-
attend-copenhagen-climate-talks (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). The White House announced that
President Barack Obama will personally participate in the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen
on December 9, 2009, and that "the President is prepared to put on the table a U.S. emissions reduction
target in the range of 17 percent below 2005 levels in 2020" toward his goal to reduce emissions 83
percent by 2050-30 percent reduction below 2005 levels in 2025 and a 42 percent reduction below 2005
in 2030.
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